Channels of monetary influence: a survey by Roger W. Spencer
Channels of Monetary Influence: A Survey*
ROGER W. SPENCER
MONG the numerous controversies surrounding
“money’, few are further from resolution than the is-
sue of how money affects the economy. Compounding
the controversy is the Fact that the arguments ad~
vanced are not divided neatly along so-called mone-
tarist and nonmonetanst lines. but are separated by
other criteria.
To be sure, rnonetansts have long taken exception
to the intellectual straitjacket of the Keynesian
framework which limited the influence of monetary
actions to the response of investment to iiflerest rate
changes. However, the monetarIst alternatives offered
have been far from uniform. Certainly, monetary ac-
tions result in the change of more than one relative
price — the interest rate and one type of spending
— investment. However, substantial disagreement
among rnonetansts (as sveii as other economists) per-
sists beyond this point.
There is basic agreement that at less than full em-
p]oyment, chai~gesin the rate of growth of the money
supply affect output and employment before prices, a
proposition which may be traced back at least two
hundred years (Flume [48}), but this tells nothing
about how total spending and its components react to
monetary actions, It is necessary to examine the
changes in relative prices arid wealth associated with
monetary impulses to gail) insight into the money—
spending relalion.
When the existing money stock (however defined)
either exceeds or falls short of the quantity demanded,
wealih and/ui’ relative prices change and this sets off
1)0th substitution and wealth effects, as indicated in
the a000mpallyrng diagram) The changes in relative
*11w author acknowledges the hdpful comments on earlier
drafts of George Kaufman, Thomas Mayer, John Pippenger,
Robert Rasehe, Wililam Rawson, C~aik Warburton, and
William Yohe. They are blameless for remaining errors.
~The ‘correct” definition of money and the determinants of
money demand and suppiy firnetions are matters closely re-
lated to. but beyond the scope of the presetit article. Another
hrnitation is that because of the large number of authors sur-
veyed, only the briefest of summaries can be given here, in
some cases, this results Ui considerable oversimplification of
complex analyses.
Substitution and wealth effeets are treated here as essentially
equivalent to substthition and income effects of generally-
prices typically involve changes in the rates of return
on real capital and financial assets as well as changes
in the prices of goods and services. Ways in which
changes hi wealth may influence spending include
movements in leal cash balances and changes in the
market value of equities.
There remains eo~siderab1edisagreement about the
relative importance of these factors in the transmis-
sion of monetary inpulses. This is not surprising, given
the history of the relative price and wealth relations.
Keynes, as ~veI1as prominent economists who pre-
ceded him, was ambiguous on the subject. This article
first traces the early development of these two factors
and then analyzes more recent work in each area.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Among the better early efforts to explain the
money~spendinglinkages were those of Irving Fisher
and Knut Wicksell. Writing around the turn of the
celltury, they both maintained a short-run view of the
transmission process which was dominated by interest
rate movements and a long-run view in which the key
role was played by changes in real cash balances ( Money
Price Level
Fisher and Wicksell
Fisher, like other neoclassical writers, determined
that output was at its full-employment level in the
long run. In the short (or transitional) run, however,
business cycies occurred in Fisher’s time, as ~vellas in
other penods before and shice. Consequently, macro~
economic’ analysts have continued to attempt exp~a—
nations of this phenomenon. Fisher’s view of the
business cycle depended strongly on “sticky” interest
rates.-’
accepted price theory. Although monetary-induced changes
in relative prices or changes in wealth may genorato both
sui,stituUon and wealth effects, the relative price change has
often been associated more with substitution effects and the
wealth change more with wealth effeets; we will follow that
practice.
2
Sce especially Fisher’s Chapter 4, “Disturbance of Equation
and of Purchasing Power During Transition PeiioW, in
Fisher [25]. In later years, Fisher [24] associated severe
swings of the business cycle with changes in debt activity.
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The Monetary Transmission Process
This relative price effect (via interest rates) was set
off by an increase in the money stock relative to the
quantity of money demanded. The nominal money
supply may he assumed to have increased due to a
rise in the gold stock ~md, consequently, bank re-
serves. With the additioiml assumption that output
and velocity were fixed initially, a rise in the commod-
itv price level was expected to be associated with the
money supply increase. Because Fisher assumed that
the commodity pi-ice rise preceded the increase in in-
terest rates, with interest costs being viewed as a sig-
nificant component of firms’ operating costs, the rise in
the price kvel produced an increase in firms’ profits.
A continued increase in demand deposits (through
business investment loan demand) relative to cur-
rency i-esulted in yet further ii~creasesin prices and
profits. Eventhally. however, excess reserves would
run out, the interest rate would become “unstuck” and
would rise even faster than commodity prices. With
the rise in firms’ costs of operation, there would occur
a decline in profits arid investment and a sharp in~
crease in banki-uptcies. The downward phase of the
cycle was reversed when excess reserves again rose
and the interest rate had fallen accordingly.
Wicksell’s well-known “cumulative proee~s” also
captured cyclical movements of the economy largely
through interest rate changes. Some initial disturb-
ance, such as an innovation or technological break-
through would foster an increase in the desire to
invest at the prevailing interest rate. The demand for
loanable funds wouid then rise as would the “normal”
or “natural” rate of interest, the rate “at which the
demand for loan capital and the supply of savings
exactly agree” (Wickseil [89], p. 193). If, however,
the banking community failed to realize that invest-
ment demand had risen, they would maintain the
same market rate of interest through increases in the
flIOflC~supply which, given the usual classical assump-
tions, would result in commodity price rises.
Note that at this point the money supply has risen,
observed interest rates have been kept iow in relation
to the normal rate, and business spending has been
the component of aggregate demand which has in-
creased. After some period of time, the banks’ reserve
position deteriorates and monetary growth is curbed.
The market rate of interest rises to the level of the
ilatural rate, an action which ]eads to the eliminalion
of excess aggregate demand and price level increases.
In the above short-run dynamic analyses, both
Fisher and Wicksell relied on the relative price
mechanism inherent in a money-interest rates-invest-
ment framework. However, in their approach to the
determination of Iong~runequilibrium, interest rates
and investment were replaced by a treatment of the
role of real cash balances.
Fisher’s real balance explanatioll began with an as-
sumed doubling of the money supply:
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Suppose, for a moment, that a doubling in the cur-
rency in circulation should not at once raise prices,
but should halve the velocities instead; such a result
would evidently upset for each indiv~duaIthe ad-
justment which he had made of cash on hand. Prices
being unchanged, he now has double the amount
of money and deposits which his convenience had
taught him to keep oil hand.3
With the apparent increase in wealth, everyone
tries to reduce their cash balances by purchasing
goods and services, according to Fisher. Because ve-
locity (V) and output (Q) in the equation of ex-
change MV = PQ ai-e determined to be fixed in the
long run, a doubling of the money supply (M) cannot
generate any increased holdings of goods and services,
hut must result in a doubling of the price level (P).
Wicksell also saw real balances as the adjusting
variable on the return path to restoring long-run equi-
libritim after the economy had been disturbed by an
exogenous shock.
Now let us suppose that for some reason or other
commodity prices rise while the stock 0f money
remains unchanged, or that the stock of money is
diminished while prices remain temporarily un-
changed. The cash balances will gradually appear to
he too sinai? in relation to the new level of prices .-
I therefore seek to enlarge my balance. This can oniv
be done neglecting for the present the possibility
of borrowing, etc. thi-cmgh a reduction in my de-
mand for goods and services, or through an increase
in the supply of my own commodity ... or through
both together.4
The reduction in demand and/or increase in supply
will cause commodity prices to fall until they have
reached their equilibrium level. Neither Wicksell nor
Fisher mentioned the money-rnterest rates-investment
spending channel of monetary influence in their anal-
yses of movements to long-run equilibrium. Both fo-
cused on changes in real cash balances without
explaining in detail the substitutlim and wealth proc-
esses involved. Although their long-run vs. short-run
analyses were similar in many respects, Fisher was
probably more noted for his long-mn quantity theory
views and Wicksell more for his short-run cumulative
process.
Keynes
Like Wicksell aild Fisher, Keynes’ position on the
monetary transmission mechanism was somewhat
~Fisher [25], p. 153.
‘Wicksdl, [901, pp. 39-40. Wicksell’s treatment of the real
balance effect is considered superior to Fisher’s because the
former avoided the trap of dichotomizing the determination
of rehtive prices and the absolute price level. See Patinkin
[63].
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Keynes’ substitution effect, which was a part of
a relatively early portfolio choice model, stressed
the money-interest rates-investment spending channel.
Did Keynes think changes in the rate of growth of the
money supply affected interest rates? There seems to
be little doubt that he did. The principal evidence to
the contrary may be fow~din the following passage
from The General Thconj of Employment Interest
Lind Money:
There is the possibility, for the reasons discussed
above, that, after the rate of interest has fallen to a
certain level, liquidity-preference may become vir-
tually absolute in the sense that ~dmost everyone
prefers cash to holding a debt which yields so io\v a
rate of interest. In this event th0 monetary ai~thority
wcmld have lost effective control over the rate of
interest. But whilst this limiting case might become
practically important in future, I know of no exam-
ple of it hitherto. Indeed, owing to the unwillingness
of most monetary authorities to deal boldly in debts
of long term, there has not been much opportunity
for a test. Moreover, if such a situation were to
arise, ft would mean that the public authority its&f
could borrow through the banking system on an
irnlimited scale at a nominal [very low] rate of
interest.5
Note that after raising the possibility that a “liquidity
trap” situation could conceivably arise in the future,
Keynes immediately disavowed its existdilce under
conditions (the low employment, low interest rate pe-
Hod of the 1930s) in which Keynesian analysis sug-
gesteci it would likely occur.
Regarding the second part of the money-interest
rates-investment channel, there is considerable evi-
dence that Keynes thought investment to be quite
responsive to inteiest rate changes (Leijonhufvud
[53], pp. 157-185) However, the interest sensifivity
of investment was restricted in the main to long-term
rates, which changed only siowiy.
There are a number of wealth effects to be found in
The General Theory which relate to either price-in-
duced changes in wealth (changes in wealth associ-
ated with changes in the absolute price level) or in-
terest-inthwed movements in wealth (changes in
wealth associated with changes in yields). Of the
basic price-induced and interest-induced wealth ef-
fects, it has been alleged that “Keynes stated both
5Keynes [51], p. 207. Bracketed expression supplied.
ambiguous. Some
found little or no
price effects while
having advanced a
critics have contended that he
role for either wealth or relauve
others have credited Keynes with
significant role for both.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS NOVEMBER 1974
parts of the wealth effect, emphasized their impor-
tance, and then let wealth slip through his fingers by
his failure to build it into his analysis.” (Pesek and
Saving [64], p. 21). This criticism is unjustified to the
extent that those parts of Keynes’ analyses which sub-
sequently enjoyed sustained popularity are riot neces-
sarily those parts favored by Keynes. For example,
the “liquidity trap” was not an intrinsic part of Keynes’
analysis (he denied its occurrence); yet it became
closely associated with his name as one of his major
contnbutions.
It is easy to see how Keynes’ wealth effects were
overlooked by those analysts quick to interpret and
popularize his basic theory, Keynes brought up the
price-induced wealth effect and minimized its signi-
ficance in the same passage: “It is, therefore, on the
effect of a falling wage- and price-level on the de~
rnand for money that those who believe in the self-
adjusting quality of the economic system must rest the
weight of their argument; though Ia mnot aware that
they have done so. If the quantity of money is itself
a function of the wage- and price-level [a variant of
the real bills doctrine], there is indeed, nothing to
hope ill this direction,”6
Keynes endorsed interest-induced wealth effects
more vigorously, but made it clear that even these
were of secondary importance. As a man well ac-
quainted with the stock market and windfall gains
and losses, he thought interest-induced “windfall ef-
fects” had only a minor influence on spending habits.
For if a man is enjoying a windfall increment in
the value of his capital, it is natura] that his motives
towards curreiit spending should he strengthened,
even though in terms of income his capital is worth
no more than before; .. -Apart from this, the mail’
conclusion suggested by experiern~eis, J think, that
the short—period influence oi the rate of interest
is secondary and relatively unimportant, except, per-
haps, where unusually large changes are in question.7
There is, however, sufflejeilt question about Keynes’
view of wealth effects, which appear frequenfly in
The General Theory, to spark a continuing debate.8
What Keynes actually meant is less significant than his
failure to give either monetary-induced substitution
or wealth effects a leading part in his attack against
orthodox, classical theory. By vacillating on the im-
UKeynes [51], p. 206. Bracketed expression supplied.
7
Keynes [51], p. 94.
8See Keynes [51], pp. 92-93, 319. Among the participants
in the Keynes wealth effect debate have been Ackley [1],
Patinkin [63], Pesek and Saving [641, and Leijonhufvud
[53].
portance of the two major channels of monetary in-
fluence, Keynes in effect was inviting his interpreters
to close off the channels completely.
THE RELATIVE PRICE RELATION
The most frequently cited of the relative price rela-
tions, money-interest rates1nvestrnent, obviously con-
sists of a money-interest rates channel and an interest
rates-investment channel, Closure of either of these
channels would eliminate a basic route through which
molley is presumed to affect spending. This route was
virtually sealed off by early interpreters of Keynes
(among others) and not re-opened for about a quarter
of a centuiy.
Closet! and Re~Openod
The initial part of the money-interest rates-invest-
ment channel was attacked indirectly through innu-
endo rather than directly either by overpowering
theory or evidence. Although Keynes repeatedly
stressed the importance of the money-interest rates
linkage, J. R. Hicks, the chief architect of the IS-LM
“Keynesian” framework, failed to pass along Keynes’
emphasis. In Flicks’ [44] relatively brief arlicle which
became the most popular condensed version of
Keynes, Flicks focused on the liquidity trap as one of
Keynes’ major contributions upsetfing neoclassical
theory. Nowhere did he indicate that Keynes was un-
aware of any such situation actually having occurred.
The adoption of such slogans as “yo~i can’t push on a
string,” or “you can lead a horse to water, but you
cailt make him dñnk” provided popular support for
Hicks’ interpretation of Keynes’ view of the money-
interest rates ehaimel in periods of economic slack.
Empirical studies of the late 1930s were the main
instrument employed to seal off the interest rates-
investment channel. Researchers in England and the
United States published results of surveys in which
businessmen were questioned about the importance
of the interest rate in their investment decisions.0 A
~‘astmajority indicated that interest rates had little or
no effect on their decisions to invest. These studies
were cited prominently by Alvin Hansen [39] in his
1938 American Economic Association presidential ad-
dress as evidence of the impotence of monetary pol-
icy. Moreover, as Samuelson recently noted, “. . pea-
9
SeeHenderson [42], Meade and Andrews [57], and Ebersole [211.
For a humorous criticism of the survey approach, see Eisner
[22j, pp. 29-40. A more recent example of the survey approach
is found in Crockett, Friend, and Shavell [181.
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pie like Sir John Hicks said that as far as short-term
investme~il is concerned, interest is of no consequence
as a cost; and as far as long-term investment is con-
cerned, uncertainty is so great that it completely
swamps interest, which leaves you with oniy a mini-
sonic of intermediate investment that is interest
e1astic,”~°
The eventual re-birth of the relative price channel
did mt occur until well into the 195Os, although the
seeds were planted kng before. The emergence of
portfolio choice models in the 1950s and 1960s ushered
in, among other channels, the old money-interest
rates4nvestrnent route.
Much of the literature dealing with portfolio choice
models has been associated with money demand
studies, Portfolio choice theory, however, provides the
rationale for the holding of any asset in one’s portfolio,
including molley. Instead of focusillg on the individ-
ual’s or finn’s income statement which deals with
flows, portfolio choice analysis stresses the stock rela-
tionships which are found on the asset and liability
sides of the balance sheet. The basic assumptions are
that: (1) other things equal, everyone eqintes the
marginal rate of return on each asset hi the portfolio —
allowing for risk (in terms of variaiice of return and
exclusive of price level movements), costs of acquiring
information and of conducting transactions; and (2)
an increase in the supply of any asset (on a macro
level) will lower the price of that asset relative to all
others. The increased supply of the asset leads to
diminishing marginal returns per unit of the asset,
thereby motivating the wealth holder to attempt to
substitute or exchange some of the asset whose price
has fallen for some of those whose price has not.
Changes in relative prices are a consequence of
wealth holders’ efforts to restore equilibrium to their
portfolio — that is, equate all marginal rates of re-
turn. The initial disturbance, a change in the stock of
any asset, may produce a chain of substitution effects
as wealth holders react to changing asset yields.
Although certain types of money have a zero nomi-
nal rate of retnrn by law, money continues to be held
in the portfolio for at least two reasons. First, as op-
posed to equities, for example (which may carry sub-
stantial risk along with a relatively high mean rate of
return), money holding is less risky. Second, money
economizes on the use of real resources in the gather-
ing of information and in the conduct of transactions.
An implication of this latter characteristic is that
°Sawueison [70], p. 41.
money is held to bridge the gap between income
receipts arni expenditures.”
Which assets, besides money, are included in the
portfolio? Much of the controversy surrounding the
portfolio choice framework has centered on the an-
swer to this question. The early portfolio choice
models greatly limited the range of assets and rates
of rethrn. Pigou [65] sketched a rough money-capita]
model, while Keynes [51] added government and
private debt to the menu. By assuming perfect sub-
stitutability between capital and boilds, Keynes had
only the yield differential between money and one
other asset (he chose bonds) to explain. Patinkin’s
model [63] was similar to Keynes’ in terms of assets
included and yields explained.
A major change in the approach to the number of
assets ~mdyields to he examined occurred in the early
1960s. Tohin [77], Brunner and Meltzer [9], and
Friedman [28] all expanded the portfolio menu, but
in varying degrees)2 The differing approaches of
these contemporary monetary economists ~vi11be ex-
amined ill some detail.
Three Views on the Relative Price Relation
Tobin ([77], p. 36) suggested that “a minimal pro-
gram for a theory of the capital account” should in-
clude six assets — all of which, except the capital
stock, are financial assets — and six yields. The num-
ber of assets is only slightly greater than the earlier
models, but a substantial step toward reality is taken
with the elimination of Keynes’ perfect substitutability
assumption. The choice of assets is closely restricted
to facilitate “purchasing definiteness iii results at the
risk of errors of aggregation” (Tobin [77], p. 28), If
increases in the money supply happen to reduce the
supply price of capital — the rate which wealth hold-
ers require in order to hold in their portfolios the
current capital stock below its marginal productiv-
ity, the capital stock will rise, This is the sole linkage
t1To pursue further these distirn~tions would require a de-
tailed analysis of mOiiey demand, a project much beyond
the scope of this article. The interested reader may wish
to consult Pigou [65], Hicks [43], Tobin [77] and Brtrnner—
Meltzer [101.
‘2Cagan [13} also introduced a sketchy portfolio choice sce-
nario. More reeeiillv, he focused on money—interest rate
influences [14].
The relative price meehamsm was also employed by
Warburton as early as 1946 to explain the transmission
process. ~‘In practice the effects of a change in demand or
iii suppiy, either of a specific commodity or of money (cir-
culating medium), are felt, first in some particular part of
the economy and spread from that part to the rest of the
economy through the medium of price differentials created
at each stage of adjustment>’ Warburton [88], p. 85.
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between the financial and real sectors. The “if” is nec~
essary because the increase in the supply of money
which kwers the price of money relative to other
assets may simply result in an increased demand
for financial assets, rather than for the capital stock
(real assets
One infers from Tobin that an increase in the stock
of any of the financial assets in the macro portfolio is
about as likely to stimulate investment expenditures
as is money) In this view it is unclear as to whether
an increase in the money stock can lower the supply
price of capital directly without setting off a chain of
substitution effects ranging all through the spectrum
of assets with different shades of risk-i-eturn charac-
teristics. It is apparent from Tobin’s comparative
statie framework, however, that no feedback from the
real to the financial sector occurs,
The types of real capital which are affected by
portfolio shuffling are delineated closely by Brunner-
Meltzer [9], although the number of assets and rele-
vant yields in the macro portfolio ‘are not. They clas-
sify three types of capital according to the relation
between asset prices and output prices — language
somewhat comparable with Tobin’s supply price of
capital and marginal productiv~ty.14
Increases in real capital occur as (not “if”) a rise in
the stock of base money lowers the relative price of
base money ai~dthat of its close substitutes, resulting
in an increasec1 demand for other assets, those assets
being dominated by real capital. “The increase in the
price of financial assets simuitanernisly raises real
capital’s market value relative to the capital stock’s
replacement costs and increases the desired stock rela-
tive to the actual stock.” (Brunner [5], p. 612). Real
capital is defined to exclude consumer nondurable
goods and services.1~UtAike Tobin (with regard to
his comparative static models), Brunner and Meltzer
([9], p. 379) view the monetary transmission mech-
anism as having important feedback effects.
‘~Theview that financial or liquid assets other than money
(Mi) can about as likely ailed the real sector, is advocated
more stnmgly by the Radcliffe Committee [17], Gurley
and Shaw [37], and Gramley and Chase [35], in what
became known as the New View” (from Tobin [78]).
i-lFrjedrnan’s [28] terminology is prices of services and prices
of sources as explained in the excerpt from Friedman in the
right-hand column of this page. A parallel semantic issue is
Tobiri’s preference for the term “demand debt”, Friedman
for ‘high—powered money, and Bnuiner—Meltzer for “base
money’.
15
Brunner added the general thought that ‘The wealth, in-
come, and relative price effects rnvolvecl in the whole
transmission process also tend to raise demai~d for non-
durable goods.” Brunner [5], p. 612.
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Friedman [28], in his portfolio choice-relative price
analysis, is less formal than either Tobin or Brunuer-
Meltzer in that he attempts no classification of types
of real capital, portfolio assets, or relevant yields.
Friedman acknowledges that an increase in the
money supply affects the portfolio of the financial
sector first, bift the subsequent increase in demand
may be as likely reflected next in consumer nond~ira-
bles as in any areas of real capital. Possible scenarios
are outlined by Friedman in several places.16 Ini-
tially, the prices of sources are raised relaUve to the
prices of services, thereby inducing investment and
consumer expenditures.
The key feature of this process is that it tends to
raise the prices of sources of both producer and
consumer services relative to the prices of the serv-
ices themselves; for example, to raise the prices of
houses relative to the rents of dwelling units, or the
cost of purchasing a car relative to the cost of rent-
ing one. It therefore encourages the production of
such smtrees (this is the stimulus to liwesUnent’
conceived broadly as inch cling a nmch wider range
of items than are ordinarIly included in that teim)
and, at the same time, the direct acquisition of
services rather than of the source (this is the stimu-
li’s to consumption relative to savings ) But these
reactions in their unil tend to raise the prices of
services relative to the prices of soijrces, that is, to
undo the initial eflects on interest rates [broadly
defined]. The final result may he a rise in expendi~
tures in all directions without any char~gein interest
at all.’7
A Comparison of Three Views
The Friedman, Tobin, and Brunner-Meltzer views
of the monetary substitution effect are distinguished
by a number of points of agreement and disagree-
ment. The three views are coincident in the following:
(1) the total response of the financial sector to a
change in the money supply occurs before the total
response of the real sector; (2) money as a medium of
exchange is of less significance than money as an asset
with regard to the portfolio choice transmission mech-
anism; (3) changes in rates of return or yields on real
or financial assets are the key e1emei~tsin the trans-
mission process.
To a large extent, the differences in the three views
are due not so much to contradictory theories, but
~°Friedman [28], Friedman-Meiselrnan [33], Friedman-
Schwartz [34]. Other attempts at pinothg down the open
market purchase-bank reserves-interest rates, etc., channels
can be found in Cagan [13], Davis [191, and Ettir~[231.
l7Friedman [28], p. 462. Bracketed expression supplied. The
latter part of this quote represents one of Friedman’s inter-
pretaticrns of the feedback effect.
Page 13FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS NOVEMBER 1974
rather shades of emphasis among similar approaches.
Because Tobin insists on a formal separation of the
capital account (stocks) from the production and in~
come account (flows), he is led to highlight different
aspects of the portfolio choice process than Friedman
and Brunner-Meltzer.18
Tobin gives the impression that portfolio choice
analysis adds little to the Keynesian (not Keynes’)
view of money-interest rates-investment. Given a con-
sumption function dependent on income, but not
wealth or relative prices, consumption can be affected
by monetary actions only after investment via the
standard Keynesian multiplier. In his portfolio choice
analysis, the potential end result of the shu~ingof
portfolios is a change in real capital;10 feedback ef-
fects from the real to the financial sector do not fit
into Tobin’s capital account approach. Tobin specific-
ally draws attention to the insignificance of money’s
medium of exchange property vis a vis its zero nomi-
nal rate of return in his portfolio analysis and gener-
ally denigrates money’s “uniqueness”. Changes in
money may set off a chain of portfolio reverberations
which results in a change in desired real capital, or it
may not.
Friedman’s avoidance of formal, structural models
which specify any unique monetary transmission
process has probably contributed significantly to the
charge that monetarists’ views of how money works
are locked in a “black box”.2°Friedman’s informal
tracing of possible monetary channels, ~stresses the
point that consumer spending is as likely to be the real
sector component first to respond to monetary acions
as is investment spending, Although changes in yields
are the key to portfolio adjustments, “These effects
can be described as operaling on ‘interest rates,’ if a
more cosmopolitan interpretation of ‘interest rates’ is
adopted than the usual one which refers to a small
range of marketable securities” (Friedman [28],
p. 462).
Brunner-Meltzer tread a path between Tobin and
Friedman in their methodological approach to port-
18”Treatment of the capital account separately from the proS
ductioi~arid income account of the economy is only a first
step, a simplification to be justified by convenience rather
than realism” (Tobin [811, p. 15). It appears, however, that
Tobin’s efforts at moving toward greater realism (Tobin
[8-4]) are h~hibitedby the “General Equilibrium Approach”
(Tobin [81]).
19J~ an informal analysis Tobin added consumer durables to
the list of “storable am’ durable” goods —~ or real capital —
influenced in the monetary transmission process. See Tobin
[SO].
20Friedrnan’s formal model [30], [31] sheds little light on
specific monetary transmission linkages,
folio analysis. Like Tobin, they attempt to organize
the pattern of response of the real sector to monetary
impulses and eventually constnict a formal model
(Brurrner”Meltzer [12]). They also emphasize the sig-
nificance of real capital in the process with only minor
references to such spending components as consumer
nondurable goods and services.
Like Friedman, Brunner-Meltzer do not attach If”
considerations to the money-real sector linkage, nor do
they stress long substitution chains relating money
and other financial assets. Their view is also similar
to Friedman’s in that they: (1) emphasize financial
sector~rea1 sector feedbacks; (2) do not denigrate
money as an indicator of monetary actions; and (3)
stress relative prices, of which yields on securities are
only a part. Brunner points out that “Every change in
relative prices of assets (that is, durables) with differ-
ent temporal yield streams involves also a change in
suitably defined interest rates.”21
in their money demand theory, Brunner-Meltzer
[10] dwell on the medium of exchange property of
money, but this property does not appear specifically
in their formal model [12] of the transmission mech-
anism. Relative prices in the 1972 model take the
form of asset (illeluding securities) prices and output
prices, but no distinction is made between investment
and consumer goods prices. Finally, in spite of their
criticism of IS-LM models which reflect a “Keynesian”
approach to the transmission mechanism, they grant
that if changes in the stock of government debt were
presumed to have no effect on wealth, “our model
could be pressed into the standard, ISWM frame-
work” (Brunner-Meltzer [11], p. 953).
In summation, these three approaches to tracing
monetary inipulses are probably not as different as
they at first appear. Once the semantic issues are put
aside and the preferences for formal vs. informal
models are understood, the Tobin, Brunner-Meltzer,
Friedman approaches to the relative price channels
of monetary influence are quite similar. It remains to
be resolved, however, if more is to be gained by
Tobin’s admittedly heroic abstractions from reality,
Friedman’s apparent presumption that the channels
are too complex to be captured in any economic
2lflrunner [8], p. 27. FIe adds that “The general role of
interest rates does not distinguish therefore between the
Keynesian and non-Keynesian posiUons. The crucial differ-
ence occurs in the range of the interest rates recognized to
operate in the proeess. The Keynesian position restricts this
range to a narrow class of financial assets, whereas the rela-
tive price theory inckdes interest rates over the whole
spectrum of assets and liabilities occurring in balance—sheets
of households and firms” (Briinner [8], p. 27).
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model, or Brunner~Me1tzer’sapproach somewhere be-
tween these two in terms of answering the q~eslions
of the academic fraternity and the general public of
how money works.
Other Developments in the
Relative Price Relation
Two extensions of the relative price relation which,
although out of the mainstream of monetary trans-
mission research, merit elaboration are (1) credit ra-
tioning and (2) the overshoot, or feedback, phenome-
non. The former involves the allocation of resources
by price and nonprice criteria, and the latter is a
consequence of the dynamic adjus&nent of the eco-
nomy to a monetary shock.
Credit Rationing — So long as the price mechanism
functions in an open market with complete factor and
product homogeneity, resources (including credit)
are rationed by price. In so-called “imperfect” mar-
kets, however, non-price discriminatory practices
abound. Among borrowers who are the same in every
respect b~~t one, net worth for example, lenders may
advance one borrower credit at an X percent rate and
another borrower zero credit at any interest rate. At
least, that is one implication of the term “credit ra-
tioning”. As used here, “global” credit rationing is de-
fined to indicate a reduction in (the rate of) total
spending due to a rise in the non-observed interest
price of loans.
Traditionally, “local” credit rationing has been asso-
ciated with the behavior of commercial banks in ex-
tending loans in a period of “tight credit”. Arguments
for commercial bank credit rationing were advanced
in 1951 by Robert Roosa [68]. He asserted that in
periods of falling security prices (rising interest rates),
bankers prefer to pass over relatively more lucrative
commercial loans and continue to hold on to their
securities in order to avoid a recorded capital loss.
Moreover, Roosa contended that banks preferred to
hold securities as a means of countering the uncer~
tainty fostered by the monetary authorities during
critical, high-interest rate periods.
Paul Sarnuelson [69] objected to this analysis on
the grounds that it did not conform to the usual tenets
of profit-maximizing behavior of the flu-rn. He argued
that the ustrnl way of rafioning anything in “short
supply” was to allow a higher price to do the ration-
ing. Samuelson would not agree that over any other
than a very brief period, bankers would hold their
assets in relatively low-yielding securities, while ra-
tioning a set volume of loans at a fixed interest rate.
Subsequently, additional arguments were employed
to buttress the credit rationing view.22 One of these
was that default risk increased relatively more for
loans than for securities in tight credit periods. An-
other was that the banking industry is oligopolistic
and is better off to restrict the volume of loans rather
than lend out to the point required by the compe~-
tive market solution.
Legal interest ceilings have been invoked more re-
cently ii~explanations of the working of credit ration-
ing. The basic idea is that a financial institution might
be perfectly willing to lend to a borrower at X percent
in accord with such cdteria as size of loan, default
risk, and compensating balance requirements, but if
usury or other laws set a ceiling at Y percent which
happens to be below X percent, the prospective
borrower will not obtain the loan. Tie may be able to
obtain fimds from some other source, such as from a
lending facility in a state whose ceiling is higher, or
from an effectively iinregulated private individual.
There are, however, considerable costs of information
involved in addition to the higher interest costs which
may cause the potential borrower to drop out (that is,
he rationed out) of the funds market.
Interest ceilings also affect the flows of funds into
financial and i~onfinancia1iflstituth)ns, When market
interest rates rise above rates payable (considering
lipñdity, nsk, maturity, and tax factors) by savings
institutions and state and local governments, many’
savers put their funds into less regulated securilies
unirkets. The bypassed institutions accordh~g1ycut
back their lending activities. Whether the re-channel-
ing of credit results in a reduction of total spending,
however, is another matter — one which is rarely
treated in the credit rationing literature.
One study, for example, found that Regulation Q
ceilings encouraged savers to bypass commercial
banks in certain tight credit situations, allegedy forc-
ing commercial banks to curtail credit extensions.23
Since bank credit is only one component of total
credit, it cannot be assumed that a reduction in total
credit or total spending could be attributed to the
workings of Regulation Q. According to the authors
of the study, the reduction of credit available to com-
mercial bank customers “would presumably occur to
the benefit of customers of other intermediaries
~Lindbeck [55], Hodgrnari [47], and Kane [50] are among
those who have substaitially advanced the credit rationing
literature.
2~Federa1Reserve Regulation Q places a eeiling on interest
rates payable by member banks on time and savings accounts.
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and/or of those firms uble to raise funds directly in
the rnarket.”24
If it is presumed that credit rationing at one insti-
tution is not offset by increased loan activity eIse~
where, then “global” credit rationing, which is accom-
panied by a slowiiig in the rate of total spending,
occurs. Because all observed interest rates do not nec-
essarily capture a i-ise in the relative price of credit
as represented by greater information and transac-
tions costs (which are assumed to include such costs
as increased compensating balances), interest rate
changes alone would not give a complete picture of
the effectiveness of monetary actions. In certain tight
credit situations, interest rates rise to slow down
spending. But after some point at which interest yields
are confronted by legal rate ceilings, interest rates
would not give a correct pictme of the true cost of
credit. An important implication of this analysis is that
interest rates likely emit inconsistent signals with re-
spect to monetary influences on spending via relative
price changes.
Overshoot Effect — The “overshoot effect” is analo-
gous to the previously-mentioned feedback effect, in
which the real sector reacts hack upoH the financial
sector, with the onginal disturbance having come
from the financial sector. Although the overshoot may
occur by way of relative price or wealth influences,
the vast majority of the hteratllre on this topic is
couched in a relative price framework. The term
“overshoot” is indicative of the tendency of the initial
adjustment of such economic vanables as interest
rates and income to exceed the steady-state kvels.
Friedman is often identified as the current leading
advocate of this thesis, hut the argument has its roots
in studies by Fisher, Wicksell, Keynes, and Tooke.25
Friedman [28], [29], [33~pointed otit in several
places that changes in the money supply and interest
rates are inversely related for oniy a short period. A
rise in the money supply, for example, is associated
with a fall in interest rates initially. After some period
of time, the fall in interest rates will have slimulated
spending and the demand for credit. The rise in the
demand for credit will tend to reverse the initial fall
in interest rates. If spending is continually stimulated,
demand pressures will force up the price level and
price anticipations which, in t~irn,add upward pres-
s~resto interest yields.
The extent to which interest rates overshoot their
equilibrium value is dependent on many factors, in-
cluding initial conditions and the duration and degree
of monetary stimulus. It should be noted that the rise
in the price level lowers the real value of monetary
assets. At the higher price level, the quantity of money
demanded is less in real terms. Also, the rate of in-
crease of the money supply tends to slow automati-
cally due to “feedback effects through the monetary
mechanism” (Friedman and Schwartz [34], p. 562).
Thus, prices, interest rates, money, and general eco-
nomic activity are all subject to the overshoot
phenomenon.
Similar dynamic analysis has been offered by Brun-
ner-Meltzer. Through changes in wealth and relath’e
prices, they postulate that monetary impulses alter the
magnitude of and rate of return on the capital stock.
“Variations in the stock of real capital, of income ex-
pected from human wealth, or the yield expected from
real capital affect the allocation pattern of financial
assets, trigger the interest rnechathsm, and generate a
feedback to the asset prices of real capital.” Thus,
monetary impulses not oniy affect the real processes
b~treal impulses feed back to financial processes.”26
Brunner also noted the role of price anlicipations in
the feedback process and postulated that without
continuing morley growth acceTeration, initial output
and employment gains would be offset over lime.27
Tobin’s basic comparative static framework revealed
no role for the overshoot effect. On at least two occa-
sions (Tobin [82], [84]), however, lie engaged in
dynamic analysis. On both occasions he pointed out
that initial disturbances in the real sector which affect
the money supply (endogenity of money) are a plau-
sible explanation of observed money-income relation-
ships. in one instance (Tobin and Brainard [84],
p. 119), lie noted that an exogenous change in bank
reserves would produce an adjustment path of the
yield on real capital which overshoots and oscillates.
20
Brunner—Meltzer [9], p. 379.
27
Bruoner [71, p. 13. Friedman ([29], p. 10) made the same
point regarding monetary acceleration via a comparison of
the market unemployment rate—natural unemployment rate
with the market interest rate-natural interest rate.
The feedback effects noted in the formal Brurnier-Meltzer
model [12] are started by an initial dLsturbance in the out-
put market, and thus are not quite comparable to earlier
analysis.
~Jaffee and Modigliani [49], pp. 871-72. Although Jaffee
and Modigliani suggest that credit rationing of commercial
banks is offset by increased loan aetivity in other areas, the
reverse does not necessarily hold. The FRB-MiT model,
with which Modigliani has been closely associated, finds a
credit rationing effect through non-commercial bank savings
institutions not offset by increased commercial bank activity.
See deLeeuw and Gramheh [20].
25
Sce Fisher [25], Wicksdll [89] (natural interest rate vs.
market interest rate), Keynes [511 (the Gibson paradox),
and Tooke [86] (the Ricardo-Tooke Conundrum).
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Even the standard IS-LM framework can be al-
tered so as to give interest rate and income over-
shoots.28 It can be shown that differences in the ad-
j~istmentpattern of investment to interest rates and
money demand to interest rates are capable of pro-
ducing interest rate and income overshoots. If invest-
ment is dependent at all on the current interest rate,
a sharp drop in interest rates can cause investment to
expand and income to rise; if money demand is a
function of income, there ensues a rise in money cle-
mand which reacts hack on interest rates.
It is possible to conjecture fairly complicated reac-
tion patterns to relative price changes, even without
such complications as an accelerator effect, or changes
in the absolute price level. Even working within a
simple analytical framework, it would be difficult for
policymakers to attempt to stahiTize incomes or inter-
est rates if they did not know whether the adjustment
paths were monotonic or cyclical. Considerable empiri-
cal verification of the overshoot or cyclical process in
the “real” economy has been provided.29
THE WEALTH RELATION
The monetary channel of influence which operates
through changes in wealth is best approached by
examii~ation of the linkages between wealth and
consumption. Although the substitution effect, in some
versions, is seen to work through consumer spending
as well as investment, the wealth effect has been
typically limited to the consumer sector. One (lefini-
tion of nonhuman money wealth is
WNH PK + D +
Monetary factors affect each of these components of
nonhuman money wealth in varying degrees.
~8See Laidler [52], Smith [73], Thimer [74] and Tucker
[87].
29See Silber [72] and Christ’s ([161, pp. 444-45) revie\v of
large econometric models.
Real human wealth, vie, is determined by the
present value of one’s expected lifetime income, a
concept related to permanent income or even dispos~
able income (with the appropriate lags), but not di-
rectly related to monetary actions. Real consumption
(c) is assumed to be a function of both types of
wealth as described by
WNH c = e(wn
The human wealth concept forms the typical Keyne-
sian element in the consumption function. The ida-
lion between nonhuman wealth (divided by the price
level), and consumption is probably less well
accepted.
Because the arguments for the D and 9 elements
of the wealth effect are closely intertwined, they will
he discussed together as “Real Balance Effects”. The
PlC section follows under the heading “Equity Effects”.
Real Balance Effects
As mentioned earlier, Keynes discussed several dif-
ferent real balance effects, but made little use of them
in his general framework. Ironically, it was the work
of a prornindilt Ke3mesian interpreter which sparked
renewed interest in real cash balances. Pigou, who
generally receives the lion’s share of the credit for
reviving real cash balances,3°was disturbed by Alvin
Hansen’s stagnation thesis.
Flansen [40] charged that even with flexible prices
and wages, a perpetual state of less than full employ-
ment could we]! be the natural resting place for the
economy. Such neoclassical economists as Pigou were
willing to concede that an assumption of inflexible
prices and wages could be consistent with the thesis
of a less than full employment state, but only given
this important assumption. Pigon demonstrated that
the rise in real cash balances associated with a falling
price level and unchanged money stock would in-
crease consumer spending, reduce saving, and thereby
pennit the rate of interest to rise above some assumed
“liquidity trap” level.
By associating consumption with real cash balances,
Pigou drove a wedge into the small opening left for
monetary policy by the Keynesians of the late 1930s.
Because consumption comprises a much larger per-
centage of total spending than business fixed invest-
30Pigou [66]. See also Haberler [38] aiid Scitovszky [71].
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where
P pflce of real capital
K stock of capital ( EK ~—market value of equity)
D monetary base p1~sfraction of bank debt not
counted in PK
Grit government debt (one dollar multiplied by the
number of securities outstanding, each of which
is assumed to be a consol)
= market interest rate market value of out-
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ment, the potential for monetary policy to affect total
spending was greatly expanded. Pigou and others who
fonnulated real cash balance theories in the early
1940s did not claim much empirical significance for
this effect. Their c(JncCrll was only to show that it was
theoretically plausible for the economy to return to
full emp1oymet~tunder the assumption of price and
wage flexibility. They did not take up Keynes’ wind-
fall effect or any other aspect of the monetary wealth
effect. Thus, their concern was limited to the “D”
portion of the nonhuman wealth definition, with the
relevant debt typically taken to he the governments
demand debt (or monetary base).
Don Patinkin took up the discussion of real cash
balances in the post-war period31 He also ignored
the hflerest-induced wealth effects and focused on
theoretical rather than empirical considerations. Patin-
kin’s chief contribution to the chani~e1sof influence
controversy was to spell o~it the hiterplay between the
positive real cash balance effect and the negative real
cash balance effect which combine to produce propor-
tionality between money and prices (the “quantity
theory>’) between periods of short-run equilibrium32
Prominent among those disputing the usefulness of
the real cash balance approach have been Flicks and
Hansen, who also downgraded the monetary relative
price channel. 1-Tansen’s [41] criticism of the real bal-
ance effect was limited to a short note in which he
agreed that the effect could theoretically bring a halt
to a downturn. but could not generate the spending
required to attain full employment.
Hicks devoted more effort to wealth considerations,
as demonstrated by the important role of wealth in
his landmark book, Value and Capital [45]. However,
neither in Value and Capital nor subsequently did he
attach much significance to a monetary weallh effect,
Flicks omitted real balance effects in Valne and Capi-
tal and only thirty years later did he find any use for
the concept at all.33 The dominailt channel of mone-
3t
Patinkin [63]. Patinkin’s first articles on real cash balances
appeared in the late 1940s.
~2Thepositive real balance effect associates the demand for
real ba1arn~es(positively) with money and the negative
real balance effect associates the demand for real bal-
ances (inversely) with prices. The demand for goods is
related to one’s holding of real cash balances.
a
3
Leijonhufvjd noted Hicks’ lack of consideration for either
price-induced or interest-ind~~cedwealth effects h~ Value
and Capital. “It is interesting to note that the first edition of
Va/tie and Capital did not take the real balance effect into
account. In the second editioi~, Hicks responded to the
critieisms of Lange and Mosak on that issue by admitting:
‘I ~vas too much in love with the simplification which comes
from assuming that income-effects [Pigou effects] ca~eeI
out when they appear on both sides of the market’ (p. 334).
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tary infimmee, so long as no liquidity frap exists, was
through his portfolio choice-relative price route.
Exactly what should he included in the “D” portion
of the real balance wealth definition has been the
subject of debate in more recent years. In most cases,
private debt typically is assumed to cancel out. I-low-
ever, Pesek and Saving [64] maintained that because
no interest is paid for demand deposits, wealth
(which accrues to hank stockholders) increases in
proportion to demand deposits. Thus, they would
count both inside money (demand deposits) and out-
side money (monetary base) in net private wealth,
contrary to the traditional view which counts only
outside money. To include all inside money as wealth,
however, would likely result in some double counling.
If the inside money benefits to banks are capitalized
in the value of the banks’ stock, as are the typical
gains to nonbai~kfirms, the same inside money would
he found in the “D” portion and the “PlC” portion of
the wealth equation. To the extent that demand de-
posit gains are not capitalized instantaneously, there
should be some allowance made for the addifion of
inside money to net wealth, The effect on spending
would be through additional outlays by bank
stockholders.
What about government securities (G) held by the
p~ibIic?Do these represent private wealth? They only
represent private wealth to the extent that the public
does not anticipate offsettmg future tax increases to
eliminate such debt. The term in the wealth
equation may have some effect on spending thro~igh:
(1) changes in the magnitude of G; (2) changes in
the composition of C; and (3) changes in r.
One source of controversy concerning changes in
wealth has been the relation between G and D. The
two have frequently been summed (interest-bearing
debt plus non-interest hearing debt) in empirical and
theoretical investigations of the effects of “liquidity”
on the economy. If it can be assumed that C and D
are good substitutes, their composition is of less con-
While this did not lead him to reconsider also the assmuip-
tion that the wealth effects of interest changes cancel, it
may \veil be that the same remark applies also to this
problem.” (Leijonhiifvud [53], p. 275).
Hicks eventually took note of the real cash balance ver-
sion of the wealth effect in a review of the first edifion of
Patinkin’s book. Hicks missed the point initially that a rise in
real cash balances stimulates spending, as he later admitted
in his Critical Essays ([46], p. 52). In 1967 he recognized
the existence of a ‘liquidity pressure effect’ — but thought
it had merit only in restraining an expanding economy.
This concept, of course, is a variation on the monetary pol-
icy ‘can’t push on a string” thesis.FEDERAL RtSERVE SANK OF ST LOUIS NOV!MBEA 1074
cern than their sum.3 Early empirical investigations
of wealth effects pllblished shortly after the accumiña-
tion of much government debt in World \Var II often
tested the real balance effect as the sum of G and
~ Many found a strong relation between liquid
wealth and consumption. If this can be called a direct
channel, a more indirect route, via interest rates. has
been envisioned by others.
lobin [79] emphasized aggregate monetary wealth
and its compositnm with respect to the effect on in-
terest rates. Not oniy does an increase in monetary
wealth relative to real assets lower the supply price of
capital and thereby induce investh~ent,but an in-
crease in short-term government debt relathe to long-
tei-m debt (110 change in aggregate deht) may achieve
the same result. These actions are closer to fiscal poi-
icy or debt management policy than to what is nor-
mally labeled monetary pohey.
To the extent that monetary actions affect the
yields on government debt, there is~~~n interest-inì-
duced monetary wealth effect on consumption. If ex-
pansive monetary actions lower the “r” component of
~proportionateIy more than “G” in the wealth defini-
tion, nonhuman money wealth rises, as does (under
typical assumptions) consumption. Of course, a mone-
tary overshoot effect would reverse the fall in interest
rates and subseqiwntly ~vorkin the opposite direction
on consumer expenditures. Also, if the rise in the price
of securities (fall in interest rates), induces those
wealth holders who have not yet purchased securities
to pay a higher price for their securities, this particu~-
lar group may curtail their outlays for consumer
goods.36
HProponents of the “New View” also add non—government,
non-bank liabilities, such as savings and loan shares, to the
total. See Brunner [6].
The Radcliffe Committee [171 found a role for money to
affect spending if it added to total liquidity, to include
funds made available by non—bank financial institutions.
John Gurley noted that the Committee “believes that
changes in these [interest] rates have had little direct effect
on spending; and it does not think that there is any direct,
close connection between the money .suppiy and spending.
But while money is shoved out of the house through the
front door, for all to see, it does make its reappearance
surreptitiously through the back door as a part of general
liquidity: and the most important source of liquidity is the
large group of financial institutions.” Gurley [36], p. 685
Bracketed expression supplied.
35
See Patinkin’s empirical chapter [63]. Lerner [54] theo-
rized that continued growth of government debt, as in
World War II, would eventually induce sufficient con-
sumer expenditures as to eliminate any excess of savings over
investment at full—employment income, lie did not attempt
an empirical test, however.
34
See Leijonhufvud ([53], pp. 241-42) for a discussion of
this effect. Lawrence Klein, who recognized the potential
of interest-induced changes in wealth to affect consumption
As far as the real-balance effect, especially that part
which pertains to “D” is concerned, there is little in-
dication that Tobin Brunller—Meltzer, or Friedman
envision monetary influences as having much impact
through this channel.37 In at least two cases, however,
these leading monetary economists have found a strong
role for the money-equity channel. Their views on the
money-equity route will be discussed after mention of
some of the earlier proponents of this channel.
.Equity Effect
How can monetary actions affect the market value
of equity, “PK”? One aUS\VCr was provided by Lloyd
Metzler, who re-opened the equity channel in 1951
which had been described earlier by Keynes. Metzler
[58] was probably the first economist whose formal
model inclilded the investment-borrowing costs than-
nel and both aspects of the wealth channel — real
cash balances and private equities38 Metzler, how-
ever, made the unusual assumption that the Federal
Reserve increases the money stock through purchases
of privately held common stock.
An increase in the money stock (in the Metzler
model), given full employment, results in a propor-
tional increase in prices and this no change in con-
sumption with real balances remaining constant. The
Federal Reserve’s purchase of common stock lowers
net private wealth (the volume of securities in private
hands falls) and consequently, consumer spendii~g.
The fall in consumer expenditures is accompanied by
a rise in saving, a fall in the rate of interest, and the
conseqi~entincrease ill capital intensity. Criticism of
Metzler’s model centered on his unusual assumptions,
which, among other results, gave a negative associa-
tion between monetary growth and consumer
spending.
The more orthodox conjecture, that monetary
growth, the market valuation of equities, and con-
inversely, related to the author recently that an inverse rela—
lion is more likely in the depression state, such as the 1930s.
than today.
37’Like Friedmari (1970, pp. 206-7) we believe that the
rea~-ba1aneeeffect is one of several explanations of long—run
chai~gesin the IS curve. We agree, also, that the short—run
miportance of the real—balance effect is small &rnugh to
neglect in most develcpecl economies where real balances
are a small part of wealth. In our analysis the size of the
traditional real—balance effect depends on the proportion of
money to total nonltuniaii wealth, a factor that is less than
.05 for the United States” ( Bronner and Meltzer [11],
p 847).
~Tinbergen provi led the first empirical test of an equities—
consumption relation. Dividing cons~imption into that by
income earners and non-workers, he found that “a fall in
capital gains had already caused a decline in consumption
between 1928 and 1929” (Tinbergen [75], p. 78).
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sumer spending are all positively related, has bed
given theoretical and empirical support by Franco
Modigliani. Modigliani [59], [60] advaticed formal
theoretical models in 1944 and 1963. He recognized a
role for wealth-consumpt1on influences in his revised
model of the economy (called the “rnid-50s” model)
which he acknowledged had been omitted from the
1944 model. His new consumption equabon was
where
CC(X,~,r.[~~2
X = real income
= Modigliani’s life-cycle aggregate labor income
variabl&9
r = the rate of return on (or cost of) capital
12 = the net worth of the private sector.
p
The two latter monetary-related terms, the borrowing
cost variable and the wealth variable, appeared in
much the same form in the FRB-MIT model of the
later 1960s, a model with which Mochghalli has been
closely identified.
The money-equities-consumption channel in the
FRB-MIT model hinges on the substitutability of
bonds and stocks. If an increase in demand for, say,
Treasury securities, by the Federal Reserve results in
lower yields and higher prices for these securities,
other investors could ~vc1Ibe discouraged from pur-
chasing the now higher-priced Treasury securities, but
securities whose price was not initially affected by
the Federal Reserve action. To the extent that de-
mand is shifted to equities from Treasury securities
because of their higher price, there is a rise in com-
mon stock prices, which is reflected in a rise in PK.
The higher equity prices represent capital gains to
equity owners. The wealth effect portion of this proc-
ess is the inducement to spend on the part of equity
owrn~rsbecause of their increased net worth. Over a
sixteen-quarter period, the equity channel represents
45 percent of the enlire monetary influence on total
spending in the FRB-MIT model.4°
39
ModiglianiBrnmberg [621 in 1954 related consumption to
one’s expected income over his life span. The discounted
value of ‘permanent” income is human wealth, or = w.
Nefther Modigham~Bruniberg nor Friedman [27] related
monetary-ii~duced nonhuman wealth to consumption at this
early stage.
WdeLeeuw and Gramlich [20], p. 487. Other simulations by
Modigliamof the FRB-MIT model indicate an even stronger
equities eflect when alternate forms of the money—equities—
consumption equations are run. Modigliani [61], however,
did not accept these as realistic.
It is not likely that Friedman would credit any sort
of monetary-induced nonhuman wealth effect as hav-
ing that much influence on spending. The relalive
price channel dominates his discussion of the channels
of monetary influence ir~ numerous articles (Friedman
[28], [33], [34]). In more recent studies in which
Friedman developed a formal economic model, he
omitted wealth from the consumption function, using
oniy C/p = f(I, r).41 One indication that nonhuman
wealth is of some significance in his view of the
transmission process emerged in a recent article in
which he attempted to delineate initial and subse-
quent shifts in the IS-LM apparatus.42
Until recently, Tobin apparently shared Friedman’s
lack of enthusiasm for monetary-induced wealth effects
on consumption. His omission of wealth influellees on
consumption may be found in his informal models of
the early 1960s as well as his more detailed models of
the late 1960s.43 It is not so mllch that Tobin denied a
wealth effect, rather that he preferred to keep stock
and flow variables separate. Thus, consumption (and
saving) were functions of flow variables specifically
income — and not wealth, a stock concept. “The pro-
pensity to consume may depend upon interest rates,
hut it does not depend directly on the exisfing mix of
asset supplies or on the rates at which these supplies
are growing.”41
In a significant departure from most of his previous
studies, Tobin [85] stressed the importance of wealth
effects in an article co-authored with Dolde in 1971.
They considered the “two major recognized channels
of monetary influence on consumption: (A) changes
in wealth and in interest rates, (B) changes in liquid-
ity constraints.”45 They recognized the historical sig-
~
1
Friedrnan recognized the inadequacy of the above con-
sumption function ([30] p. 223) and ([311, p. 331) “in
a hill statement” ([30j, p. 223), because it excluded
wealth, but he stated he was attempting to stick to Key-
nesian short-period analysis. In a much earlier study, Fried~
man [261 endorsed the real balance effect more vigorously.
~
2
Fdedman ([321, p. 916) (liscussed shifts in IS-LM curves
(first_round effects vs. subsequent effects) in a manner con-
sistent with the view that wealth influences subsequent
shifts. Friedman did not mention “wealth” but Blinder-
Solow [2] interpreted his discussion in that context.
~
3
See Tobin’s early models [77], [78] and later models
[81], [84]. He did mention monetary influences o’~saving!
consumption in “Money, Capital, and Other Stores of Value
[77], and gave the relation somewhat more prominence in
the earlier “Rejative Ineome, Absolute Income, and Saving
[76].
1’Tobin [811, p. 16.
4~Tobin-Do1de [85], p. 100. Tobin’s comments concerning
the volatility of the marginal propensity to consume, espe-
cially with respect to the 1968 tax surcharge, provide a
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nificance of the Pigou effect, but wealth changes in
their study were associated with capital gains (equity
effect). Their liquidity effect referred to the cost of
converting nonliquici assets to liquid form in a world
of imperfect capital markets. The level of the penalty
rate of interest (a relative price) inhibits or encour-
ages conversion of nonliquid to liquid assets.
Using a Modig1iani~Brurnberglife-cycle model, they
concluded that wealth (equity values), interest rates,
and the liqudity constraint all have important influ-
ences on consumer spending. Their model was basi-
cally a reduced form, in that they did not provide the
linkages between monetary policy actions and mone-
tary effects.
Bmnner and Meltzer have long included a promi-
nent role for wealth effects in their view of the mone-
tary ti-ansrnission process. “PK” is the component of
nonhuman wealth mentioned most favorably in their
analysis. For example, in discussing the chain of
events following an injection of base money, Brunner-
Meltzer noted that “the resulting rise in the market
value of the public’s (nonhuman) wealth raises the
desired stock of capital III and the desired rate of
real consumption.”46 They further stated that relative
price effects also operate to increase real consumption
following the expansive monetary action.
At a later date Brunner again stressed the impor-
tance of “PK” relative to the real balance effect in the
transmission process. “The dominant portion of the
wealth adjustment induced by a monetary impulse
occurs beyond a real balance effect and depend.s oi~
the relative price change of existing real capita]. The
monetarist analysis of the trai~smissionmechallism de-
termines that this portion of the total wealth effect
thoroughly swamps the real balance or even the finan-
cial asset effects,”47
Real balances are included, however, in Brrniner
and Meltzer’s [12J formal model. Total spending
ohe as to why he chose to include wealth in the coflsump~
tion funetjon. Now if it had been true that the income—
How theory of consumption ‘vas a resounding success, and
that its indications were being borne out all the time, then
we wouldn’t need to go into the wealth theory or the life—
eyele theory and all that. We wouldn’t need to seek a
fundamental theory about why savings ratios are what they
are and how they relate to various parameters. But we all
know that the cash income theory is not a resounding sue-
cess.” Tobin [83], p. 159.
46Brunner and Meltzer [91, p. 377. Capital III refers primarily
to certain types of consumer durable goods. Exampks of the
other two types of capital delineated by Bruoner and Melt—
zer are maehiriery and equipment (Type I) arid houses
(Type II).
47Brunnor [7], p. 5.
which includes consumer spending) in that model is
influenced by, amollg other factors, nonhuman wealth.
Their nonhuman wealth variables include real capital,
the monetary base, the stock of government debt, and
the value of commercial banks monopoly position ex-
cluded from real capital (Pesek and 5avh~geffect).
Formal economic models now routinely include
wealth and/or substitution effects cm consumption.48
Few, if any, of the ernpiricaIIy-oriei~ted,structural
models permit all the wealth effects on consumptiofl
described above. For example, the FRE-MIT mode]
(Board of Governors [3]) has an equities effect but
no real balance effect; the \Vliarton Mark III model
(McCarthy [56]) has a real balance effect but no
equities effect. Only when model builders make al-
lowance for all possible monetary effects are so-called
structurally rich models as likely to reflect as sigmfi-
cant a rnoney~spending impact as reduced form
models. There is, of corn-se, a good possibility that yet
undiscovered wealth, relative price, and even mone-
tary income effects will be fotrnd in the monetary
charniels of the future.
SUMMARY
This article surveyed the rehthve price and wealth
changes set in motion when the quantity of money
supplied changes relative to money demanded. Rela-
tive price ~mdwealth changes were viewed as major
elements of the molletary transmission mechanism
around the turn of the century (in rudimentary fash-
ion) and in recent years, hut in much of the inter-
vening period their role was subjected to considerable
question.
Fisher and Wicksell favored one approach in which
wealth was the dominant monetary force ai~danother
in which relative prices were of more significance.
Keynes amplified 1)0th views, but his major interpret-
ers were not SO inclined. It is, in fact, ironic that
J. R. Hicks, who fomiulated the IS-LM interpretation
of Keynes, downgraded both monetary wealth and
relative price influences, despite his pioneering re-
search into basic wealth [45] and portfolio choice
fields [43],
Real balance wealth effects were revived by Pigou,
PatinkiH, and others while Metzler re-formulated the
equity wealth effect. Tobin, Brunner-Meltzer, and
Friedman advanced the poi-tfolio choice-relative price
effect in the early 196Os, and with the exception of
48
See, for example, Christ [15] and Rasehe [67].
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These hardly exhaust all the ways in which mone-
tary impulses affect spei~ding.For example, an income
effect occurs when the Treasury draws clown its bank
balances to purchase goods and services. A decline in
Treasury deposits relative to demand deposits in-
creases the money supply (other things equal) and
income.
AIternative~y,a rise in the money supply may be
associated with a change in relative prices and no
change in wealth. For example, a fall in currency
relative to demand deposits increases the molley sup-
ply and lowers bank loan rates, but there is no rise
in real balances — if defined oniy as outside money
— and no change in Government debt.
Thus, depending on how the money supply is
caused to change relative to money demand, sonic
effects on spending are set in motion, but not neces-
sarily all. Moreover, the fact that initial conditions, to
melude all relative prices, are never the same suggests
that under one set of circumstances initial monetary
effects may be on, say, conslimer durable goods ex-
pendithres, and under another set, state and local
government purchases. To follow explicitly the chan-
nels of monetary influence whenever there occurs a
change in the quantity of money supplied relative to
the quantity demanded, one would have to know as
a minimum the cause of the change in the money
supply, all re1eva~trelative prices, and the impact of
other exogenous events on spending units. Add to this
the effect of feedback forces, both relalive price and
wealth, and it becomes less surprising that the con-
tents of the monetary black box have been difficult to
unravel.
The complexity of the forces at work, however,
does not mean that one should despair of forecasting
the effect of molletary iiilluences on total spending
and rely on (presumably) more elementary tools to
guide economic activity. The effects of other policy
actions are also difficult to trace with certainty49
19
1t has become clear hi recent years that simply fo,ecasting
the result of fiscal policy effects on total spending requires
more than reliance on some variation of the deceptively
simple relafions YC+I+G and C=C(Y—T), These
Friedman, have also highlighted the equity wealth
effect.
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